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The legal status of gaming or gambling is not the same as other businesses. 
Gaming is said to be a "privileged" business. There is no "right" to conduct a 
gaming business. Those who conduct most common types of businesses have a 
"right" to do so. They operate by right, not by privilege. It is a well established 
principle that "where a business in itself is harmless and legitimate, the power of 
the state to regulate it is not the equivalent of the power to suppress or destroy. 
Nondangerous businesses cannot be legislated out of existence." 1 The courts have 
not found gaming to be such a business. 
Just a few months after Nevada's Gaming Control Act was enacted in 1931, 
the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the right of the City of Las Vegas to deny a 
gaming license. In so doing, the court said, "Gaming as a calling or business is in 
the same class as the selling of intoxicating liquors in respect to deleterious ten-
dency. The state may regulate or suppress it without interfering with any of those 
inherent rights of citizenship which it is the object of government to protect and 
secure." 2 
The role of the gaming industry in Nevada today is much changed from what 
it was in 1931. A 1988 study revealed that the "tourist industry" accounted for 45 
percent of total earnings in the state, 65 percent of total full time equivalent jobs in 
the state, and nearly 55 percent of state direct general fund revenues.3 The domi-
nance of the gaming industry in Nevada and its substantial impact on jobs and tax 
revenues has not softened the judicial perspective on the status of the gaming 
industry. The Federal District Court for the District of Nevada as recently as 1988 
stated: "Licensed gaming is a privilege conferred by the state and does not carry 
with it the rights inherent in useful trades and occupations."4 
Recognition of gambling as a socially acceptable activity has increased as 
gaming has expanded into jurisdictions outside Nevada and as the industry has 
moved to market itself as another form of "entertainment." Logic would suggest 
that gaming has become a "useful trade and occupation," at least in Nevada. The 
law, however, does not always follow logic. It is highly unlikely that courts will 
soon decide that gaming has become a "useful trade and occupation," even in 
Nevada Centuries of experience with gambling are unlikely to be overcome by a 
few years, or even decades, of Nevada-type success. The terminology has more to 
do with the nature of the activity and its role in society than with the economic 
effects of a well run, well regulated industry that we have today. Courts are not 
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likely to decide that economic success and even economic contribution to the state 
can be translated into a reduction of the state's authority to govern gaming by 
changing the conduct of gaming from a "privilege" to a "right." 
A more expansive explanation of the power to regulate gaming and similarly 
"disfavored" activities has been offered: 
Where a license or license tax is imposed under the police 
power as to a means of regulation, it must not be imposed on such 
terms and conditions as to operate as the virtual prohibition of a 
useful and legitimate occupation or business, and this rule has 
been held to apply regardless of whether the license tax is levied 
under the police or taxing powers. However, ... with respect to 
those occupations or forms of business that are not useful, but are 
inherently harmful and dangerous to society or the public welfare, 
license requirements and exactions may be so imposed as to dis-
courage and even amount to a prohibition of them. 5 
As the foregoing suggests, gaming is but one of the businesses deemed by 
law to be "inherently harmful and dangerous to society or the public welfare." In 
an opinion by that great defender of constitutional rights, Justice Douglas, the 
United States Supreme Court approved searches of federal liquor license holders 
as authorized by statute. Justice Douglas wrote: "We deal here with the liquor 
industry long subject to close super-
vision and inspection. As respects that 
industry, and its various branches in-
cluding retailers, Congress has broad 
authority to fashion standards of rea-
sonableness for searches and sei-
zures."6 Two years later, in a case in-
volving a federal firearms license, Jus-
tice White spoke for the Court when 
he wrote: "When a dealer chooses to 
... gaming is but one of the 
businesses deemed by law to be 
"inherently harmful and dangerous 
to society or the public welfare." 
engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he 
does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition 
will be subject to effective inspection."7 
This special status or, perhaps more accurately, lack of status that privileged 
businesses occupy with respect to constitutional protections was highlighted by 
the Supreme Court a few years later in a case resulting from an OSHA warrantless 
search which the Court held unconstitutional. 8 Noting that the earlier cases cited 
to support the search involved liquor and firearms, the Court declared: "The ele-
ment that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradi-
tion of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter 
such a business must already be aware."9 It is this "long tradition of close govern-
ment supervision" that will keep the gaming business subject to stringent regula-
tion regardless of how acceptable this business becomes in our society. 
The United States Supreme Court has more recently directly addressed the 
scope of gaming regulation. 10 In deciding that the Puerto Rico Legislature could 
restrict advertising by casinos in Puerto Rico, Justice Rehnquist distinguished some 
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cases cited by the appellant casino, stating that, in the cases cited, "the underlying 
conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally 
protected and could not have been prohibited by the State." He then wrote, "Here, 
on the other hand, the Puerto Rico Legislature surely could have prohibited casino 
gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico altogether. In our view, the greater power 
to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban 
advertising of casino gambling .... " 11 It is significant that the regulatory action 
involved a First Amendment right The Supreme Court has historically accorded 
First Amendment rights a special status and greater protection than other constitu-
tional rights. 
Prohibition of gaming or some types of gaming activities in the United States 
has often been made part of a state's constitution so that legislatures could not 
authorize gaming, or at least some forms of gaming , without first obtaining the 
consent of the electorate. States with some constitutional restrictions on gaming 
include: Arkansas, Florida, Nevada, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, California, 
and South Dakota. These restrictions, for the most part, resulted from strong anti-
gambling reform movements in the 1800s primarily directed at lotteries. 12 
States thus have very broad authority to regulate gaming. To exercise the full 
extent of this power, however, the legislature must exercise it through broad grants 
of power to regulatory authorities. 
The Licensing Process 
Regulatory control of gaming rests on three legs. The first, and many would 
argue the most important, is the licensing process. The second leg is the law and 
regulations that govern gaming operations. One of the most important aspects of 
this leg are "internal controls" on the handling and recording of cash and other 
assets. The third leg is the enforcement of the regulations, including the auditing 
and review of internal controls. 
All three legs are important, but the licensing process, if it is working prop-
erly, helps ensure the success of the remaining two legs by screening out the high-
est risks for potential regulatory violations. In addition, it enables regulators to bar 
entry to the industry of persons whose reputation would cause a lack of public 
confidence in the regulatory process and in the honesty of the gaming industry. 
One could argue that if the regulatory process were adequate, the state could grant 
every applicant a license and then discipline the licensee or revoke the license if 
the licensee violated any law or regulation. No regulatory system could guarantee 
such success, especially in a constitutional democracy. We pride ourselves on the 
constitutional protection given individual rights to protect them from governmen-
tal interference. In our society, it is unlikely that the public would have any confi-
dence in the integrity of gaming if unsavory persons were routinely receiving gaming 
licenses. 
Courts have allowed regulatory bodies great leeway in determining who should 
be licensed. That is, if the state legislature has granted gaming regulators broad 
powers to deny licenses, the courts generally uphold the exercise of that power. 
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Statutory Authority 
Nevada has given its gaming regulators broad powers to deny licenses. The 
public policy of the state concerning gaming is found and declared to be that the 
gaming industry is important to the general welfare of the state, that its continued 
growth and success is dependent upon public confidence that it is conducted hon-
estly, and that it must be free of criminal and corruptive elements. Further, no 
applicant has a right to a license, any license issued is a revocable privilege, and 
the holder acquires no vested rights. 13 
An applicant for a gaming license in Nevada has the burden of proving his 
qualification for a license. The State does not have to prove the applicant is unsuit-
able.14 Nevada statutes prohibit granting a gaming license unless the Nevada Gam-
ing Commission "is satisfied that the applicant is: (a) A person of good character, 
honesty and integrity; (b) A person whose prior activities, criminal record, if any, 
reputation, habits and associations do not pose a threat to the public interest .... " 15 
Finally, the Commission is empowered to deny an application "for any cause 
deemed reasonable by the commission." 16 New Jersey has similarly broad powers 
and requires an applicant to establish suitability by "clear and convincing evi-
dence."17 
Judicial Interpretation 
In 1977, the Nevada Supreme 
Court issued what has become a land-
mark decision in gaming regulation, 
State v. Rosenthal. 18 The court's 
opinion is a concise exposition of the 
powers that may be exercised in the 
regulation of gaming, particularly 
concerning the licensing process. The 
court held that the Gaming Control 
Act did not provide for judicial review 
of the denial of a gaming license, that 
the Act contained adequate standards 
States thus have very broad 
authority to regulate gaming. To 
exercise the full extent of this power, 
however, the legislature must 
exercise it through broad grants of 
power to regulatory authorities. 
for Commission action, and that the licensing hearing and procedures provided 
sufficient due process, or at least all of the process due an applicant for a gaming 
license. Underlying each of these holdings was the court's conclusion that the 
Gaming Control Act did not create any property interest in an application for a 
gaming license. Persons without a property interest or fundamental right at stake 
have little for the court to protect. 
The Nevada Gaming Commission, in 1976, denied Frank Rosenthal a gam-
ing license as a key employee of a company holding a gaming license. Rosenthal 
filed a petition in district court for judicial review of the Commission's decision. 
The district court held that Rosenthal's constitutional rights to procedural due pro-
cess had been violated, declared the licensing provision of the Gaming Control 
Act unconstitutional for want of standards, and nullified the decision of the Com-
mission. The Commission appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. 19 
64 Gaming Research & Review Journal- Volume 2, Issue I- I995 
The Legal Status of Gaming and Its Impact on Licensing 
The Nevada Supreme Court, its unanimous opinion authored by Justice 
Thompson, probably the most respected legal scholar on the court, reversed the 
district court and reinstated the decision of the Commission. Justice Thompson 
noted that the legislature had declared a gaming license to be a privilege and not a 
right, required board and commission members to have special qualifications suited 
to the important duties they perform, granted comprehensive powers to the regula-
tors, and limited court intrusion into the regulatory process. After reviewing the 
statute providing for judicial review, the court held that it applied only to disci-
plinary actions against licensees and thus there was no statutory provision for judi-
cial review of the denial of a gaming license.20 Justice Thompson went on to quote 
from an early licensing case, adding that it was still the law on this point: "It is not 
the province of the courts to decide what shall constitute suitability to engage in 
gambling in this state." 21 Referring to the statutory framework for gaming regula-
tion, Justice Thompson wrote that the legislature "carefully" distinguished be-
tween persons with licenses and those without, and said: "This is a reasonable 
distinction since licensees possess property interests which those who have never 
been licensed do not have."22 
By holding that there is no judicial review of gaming license denials, the 
Nevada Supreme Court could have avoided the other issues raised by the court 
below. Nonetheless, it proceeded to "decide" each of the other two issues upon 
which the district court had ruled against the Commission. Apparently the Court 
decided this was a rare opportunity to review the statutory framework for licens-
ing with an applicant whose background sharply highlights the concerns that pro-
duced such broad regulatory powers. The Commission in denying Rosenthal a 
license found him to be 
a person whose licensing by the State would reflect or tend 
to reflect discredit upon the State of Nevada by reason of: A) A 
North Carolina court finding of guilt for conspiracy to bribe an 
amateur athlete; B) Testimony of Mickey Bruce in Senate sub-
committee hearings that applicant attempted to bribe him to throw 
outcome of 1960 Oregon-Michigan football game; C) Statements 
by police officers Dardis and Clode to Senate subcommittee and 
to Florida Racing Commission that applicant admitted he was 
corrupting public officials in return for protection; D) The 
applicant's being barred from race tracks and pari-mutuel opera-
tions in the State of Florida. 23 
The court held that the Gaming Control Act provided constitutionally ad-
equate standards of licensing, and, even if it did not, by taking the regulations 
together with the statute there were more than sufficient standards to guide the 
Commission's decision making process. The statutes in question provided that 
gaming licenses should be administered "for the protection of the public and in the 
public interest in accordance with the policy of this state," and the Commission 
has authority to deny a license "for any cause deemed reasonable." 24 Justice Thomp-
son explained that the statutory provisions were adequate because "reasonable" 
action is required of the Commission. With respect to the broad grant of authority 
given the Commission to deny a license "for any cause deemed reasonable," the 
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opinion concludes that "it is entirely appropriate to lodge such wide discretion in 
the controlling administrative agency when a privileged enterprise is the subject 
of the legislative scheme."25 
With respect to the issue of procedural due process, the court disposed of the 
lower court's decision and Rosenthal's contention that his procedural due process 
rights had been violated by saying that the Commission's procedures provided due 
process. Rosenthal and his two attorneys were present for the public hearings. The 
applicant testified and was given an opportunity to explain the allegations of crimi-
nal activity in his past and to argue his position. Witnesses testified on his behalf 
and letters attesting to his good character and reputation were read into the record. 
In other words, it was not the due process that Rosenthal wanted, but it was all that 
was due him as an applicant for a gaming license. 
The Due Process Clause of both the Nevada and United States Constitutions 
refers to the deprivation of "life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
Justice Thompson, writing for the 
court, based the Rosenthal decision 
on the Nevada Constitution and as-
serted that control of gaming is a 
matter reserved to the states under 
the Tenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and there are no 
federally protected constitutional 
rights related to gaming. The United 
States Supreme Court declined re-
view of this case. At least one fed-
... if the gaming legislation is 
properly drafted, a property 
interest in a gaming business does 
not exist until the state confers it. 
eral judge agrees with Justice Thompson and the Nevada Supreme Court. Judge 
Roger D. Foley, Senior Judge for the District of Nevada, in a case that dealt not 
with licensing but with the power of the State to require certain persons to be 
excluded from casinos, stated: "Licensed gaming is a matter reserved to the states 
within the meaning of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."26 
No other cases have been found asserting that legal position. Both state and fed-
eral courts, however, have reached similar conclusions with respect to regulatory 
powers without the Tenth Amendment rationale. It is the lack of a property inter-
est, the lack of a fundamental right at stake, and the historical treatment of gaming 
as an activity not deserving of the legal protections afforded "useful trades and 
occupations" that achieves a like result. 
After stating that Rosenthal had received due process, the court noted that 
"gaming is a privilege conferred by the state and does not carry with it the rights 
inherent in useful trades and occupations."27 Referring to the legislature's distinc-
tion between those who have licenses and those who do not, Justice Thompson 
declared: "The license which is declared to be a revocable privilege, may not be 
revoked without procedural due process first being afforded the licensee."28 Until 
the state grants a license there is no property interest, no protectible right that 
requires due process to be accorded an applicant Once the Commission grants a 
license, a property right is created, a protectible interest exists, and a right to pro-
cedural due process attaches. Later cases have held that whatever rights or interest 
a licensee obtains by virtue of receiving the license, it is limited to the terms of the 
license and vanishes the moment the license expires. 
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Nate Jacobson, a former licensee, claimed a violation of his due process rights 
by the Nevada Gaming Commission and the Gaming Control Board.29 Jacobson 
was a former licensee who was seeking licensing as a landlord that would give him 
a continuing interest in the casino operation he had previously been licensed to 
own and operate. He was found suitable as a landlord but subject to conditions he 
found burdensome, so he sold and sued. The federal district court held that Jacobson 
had failed to state a claim for denial of due process. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
holding that Jacobson's status as a former licensee gave him no greater status than 
any first-time applicant. 
The circuit court then turned to the issue of whether Jacobson "had a prop-
erty interest protected by the due process clause."30 The specific question, the 
court said, was whether the Gaming Control Act provides an applicant "an expec-
tation of entitlement to a license sufficient to create a property interest."31 The 
answer, according to the opinion, depends "upon the extent to which the statute 
contains mandatory language that restricts the discretion of the Commission to 
deny licenses to applicants who claim to meet minimum eligibility requirements."32 
After noting that the Commission has a statutory grant of "full and absolute power 
and authority to deny any application for any cause deemed reasonable."33 The 
circuit court stated, "The only substantive restriction imposed upon the 
Commission's exercise of authority is the requirement that the basis for its deci-
sions be reasonable .... This wide discretion resting with the Gaming Commission 
negates Jacobson's claim to a protectible property interest created by the State."34 
The Circuit Court concluded that an "interest in a gaming license is not so funda-
mental as to warrant constitutional protection apart from its status under state law. "35 
The same year Rosenthal was decided in Nevada, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in a New Hampshire case reached similar conclusions.36 An application 
for a pari-mutuel license for greyhound racing was denied and the denied appli-
cant sought relief in the federal courts. The court said: 
[A] person's interest in participating in the ownership of a 
pari-mutuel greyhound racetrack is neither a right recognized 
under New Hampshire law nor is it a "fundamental" or "natural" 
right. ... [O]nce a license, or the equivalent, is granted, a right or 
status recognized under state law would come into being, and the 
revocation of the license would require notice and hearing. 37 
A more recent federal case involved holders of a one-year limited license in 
Nevada who were denied a permanent license at the end of the one-year term. 38 
Rejecting the claim that there was a protectible interest as a result of the limited 
license, the court held that after the expiration date of the license, the now former 
licensees "stood in the shoes of first time applicants" and "have no constitutional 
or statutory right to further licensing."39 
The first judicial review by a New Jersey court of a denied applicant for a 
gaming license was In re Boardwalk Regency Corp., 40 The New Jersey Casino 
Control Commission found the corporation, Boardwalk Regency Corp. (BRC), 
qualified for a license, but found the Perlman brothers, Clifford and Stuart, un-
qualified as owners, and therefore conditioned the issuance of the license on the 
divestiture of the Perlmans' interests in the operation. Clifford was Chairman, 
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CEO and ten percent shareholder of Caesar's World, Inc., the parent corporation 
of BRC. Stuart was Vice-Chairman and eight percent shareholder of Caesar's. The 
Commission held that BRC had failed to establish by "clear and convincing evi-
dence" that the Perlman brothers possessed the "good character, honesty and in-
tegrity required by the Casino Control Act to qualify for a license"41 The issu-
ance of a license to BRC was conditioned upon the Perlmans disposing of any 
interest they held in any of the Caesar's World companies and being removed 
from any position as officer, director or employee of Caesar's World, Inc. or any 
of its subsidiaries. 
Some of the facts that troubled the Commission included Clifford Perlman's 
"repeated and enduring" relationship with Alvin I. Malnik, whom the Commis-
sion asserted was "a person of unsuitable character and unsuitable reputation ... 
[who] associated with persons engaged in organized criminal activities, and [who 
had] himself participated in transactions that were clearly illegitimate and ille-
gal."42 Malnik had been identified in the media as a business associate of Meyer 
Lansky, a reputed organized crime figure. Perlman continued his association with 
Malnik even after Philip Hannifin, Chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board, 
had expressed his concern about that association and received Perlman's commit-
ment to sever a business relationship with Malnik. The appellate court found that 
the Commission's findings "were reasonably available on the whole record," and 
stated it would not disturb those findings. While there was no evidence directly 
against Stuart Perlman, the Commission and the court found "that the affairs of the 
brothers are inextricably entwined."43 
The Perlmans complained that the Commission's findings did not support a 
bad character conclusion. The appellate court replied: 
The statutory burden to demonstrate affirmatively the quali-
fying attributes, whatever they might be, has been expressly and 
clearly placed on the applicant by the Legislature and is subject to 
the canon of clear and convincing evidence. It is not necessary to 
disqualification that the applicant or any personnel required to be 
qualified be of demonstrably bad character. Disqualification is 
justified by their failure to prove themselves qualified by clear 
and convincing evidence. 44 
The court pointed out that with respect to gaming matters "to doubt is most cer-
tainly to deny ."45 
Responding to the Perlmans' contention that the Commission had taken its 
action because of "unknowing or otherwise innocent association," the court ac-
knowledged the difficulty of defending such a premise. It then went on to say that 
the Commission was obviously disturbed by the "apparent insensitivity of the broth-
ers to the potential impact of those associations upon the industry, those who regu-
late it, those who manage it, those who patronize it and the public in general."46 
The court concluded, "This sensitivity on the part of the Commission respecting 
the insensitivity on the part of the Perlmans resides safely within the four corners 
of the statute where strict regulation is expressly mandated."47 
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Such strict regulation, the court said, had been exercised for many years in 
New Jersey with legislative power "almost without limit" in such industries as 
liquor and horseracing, and, the court concluded, "We see every reason . . . for 
legalized casino gaming to take its deserved place among those industries."48 
The Perlmans contended that the "good character" required by the Casino 
Control Act was unconstitutionally vague. The court disposed of this issue sum-
marily, stating "the words 'good character' in the context of the Casino Control 
Act leave to men of common intelligence little doubt about their meaning. "49 
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision ex-
pressing approval of the legal analysis, except where it ruled against the Commis-
sion on the removal of the Perlmans from all positions in Caesar's World, Inc. and 
its subsidiaries. 50 The supreme court reinstated the Commission's decision. 
Unlike Nevada, where the Gaming Control Act provides for judicial review 
Because of the historic legal status of 
gaming, however, legislatures do have 
powers with respect to the gaming 
business that are unheard of in other 
business or commercial contexts. If 
legislatures make their intent clear by 
the language they employ, our courts 
will generally uphold this unusual 
exercise of governmental power. 
of Gaming Commission 
disciplinary decisions and 
some other decisions and 
orders, but not for licensing 
decisions, 51 the New Jersey 
Casino Control Act pro-
vides for judicial review of 
all decisions and orders of 
the Casino Control Com-
mission.52 
The appellate division 
of the superior court took 
pains to explain the stan-
dards it would apply in its 
review of the Commission's 
decision. In Nevada, the 
courts generally defer to the 
expertise and judgment of 
the gaming regulators; however, the New Jersey court stated it would not defer to 
the Commission's expertise because "expertise has not yet developed by experi-
ence or special training," alluding to the limited experience of the regulators who 
had licensed one other casino, Resorts. Nevertheless, the findings of the Commis-
sion were upheld by the appellate court in every instance except one and that was 
reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court and all provisions of the Commission's 
Order were reinstated. Today, with the Casino Control Commission having al-
most twenty years of institutional experience behind it, New Jersey courts would 
most likely defer to the Commission's expertise. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals sustained a denial of a gaming license for an 
employee of a gaming operation who had a bookmaking conviction in California 
twenty-three years before applying for the gaming license. Colorado statutes pro-
vide that an applicant who has been convicted of a gambling related offense may 
not be licensed. The court held that the restriction was "reasonably related to the 
proper goal of assuring both honest gaming and the public perception that such 
gaming is honest."53 
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Denial of a gaming license by the Illinois Gaming Board has been upheld 
after the Illinois Appeals Court reviewed the statutory factors required to be con-
sidered in making a decision on a license application including the character of the 
applicant and financial matters relating to the application. 54 
Summary 
Whether or not control of gaming is a Tenth Amendment matter as Justice 
Thompson asserted in Rosenthal, there is no federally protected right until there is 
a property interest. And since the states can abolish gaming, they can also deter-
mine the conditions upon which the activity may exist. Therefore, if the gaming 
legislation is properly drafted, a property interest in a gaming business does not 
exist until the state confers it. The United States Constitution does not create a 
property interest in a gaming license. At best, it only protects such property inter-
ests after they are created under state law and even then subject to whatever limi-
tations state law imposes on the existence of the property interest. 
Not all states have granted their gaming regulators the broad statutory pow-
ers that the Nevada and New Jersey legislatures have given their regulators. Where 
state legislatures have not done so, courts may impose more restrictions on the 
regulatory process. Courts in those states may find a property interest in applying 
for a gaming license. If so, federal due process standards may apply in the licens-
ing process. Not every state may want to go as far as Nevada has. Nevada may be 
the only state that has denied judicial review to denied gaming license applicants. 
Many people find it almost unbelievable that gaming regulators have the 
powers they exercise because it is so contrary to an American's experience in 
other commercial activities. Because of the historic legal status of gaming, how-
ever, legislatures do have powers with respect to the gaming business that are 
unheard of in other business or commercial contexts. If legislatures make their 
intent clear by the language they employ, our courts will generally uphold this 
unusual exercise of governmental power. 
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